THE RISE OF THE PROCEDURAL PARADIGM-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EU LEGISLATION IN VERTICAL COMPETENCE DISPUTES
is how rigorously the Court should scrutinize legislation. A court's choice is arguably a twofold matter of institutional and constitutional choice. In a federal jurisdiction (and systems of a similar nature) it appears that the intensity that is used when the court reviews legislation (deriving from the central legislator) determines not only the balance of powers between the court and the legislator but also between the central government and its component entities. 2 Stringent review of federal legislation tends, put simply, to favour the states and the courts vis-á-vis the central legislator. More leeway to the legislator instead suggests that the court may not wish to encroach upon the prerogative of the legislator to make policy nor impose excessive burdens on the federal legislator in relation to the states. 3 The question of intensity and standard of judicial review is nevertheless thereto a question of who, the Court or another societal decision-maker, should make the final decision in a democracy of what the constitution means. 4 This is a question of comparative institutional choice. Courts tend to engage in more deferential review where it enjoys inferior (democratic) legitimacy, competence and expertise than the legislator to analyse a certain question. 5 Regardless whether one wishes to conceive judicial review primarily as a constitutional question or an institutional one, it seems that any judicial review court would ultimately have to address these two questions.
This essay intends to contribute to this debate by exploring the role of the European Court of Justice in judicial review of EU legislation in vertical competence disputes (ie litigation where EU legislation has been pleaded to be contrary to the constitutional principles of conferral, anticipated that the Court found the measure to be proportionate. 11 The Court of Justice's subsidiarity assessment also demonstrated a very low-intensity review. Whilst the Court did consider the substantive part of the subsidiarity test, its approach to procedural subsidiarity was strikingly deferential. The Court stated in one sentence that there was sufficient information in the impact assessment and the explanatory memorandum demonstrating the need for Union action. 12 Phillip Morris consolidates the Court's approach to judicial competence review of EU legislation which so far can be characterised as deferential and perhaps incapable of protecting the distribution of competences between the Member States and the Union. 
Institutional and conceptual problems of vertical competence review
This section provides a more detailed account of the concerns against judicial review raised in the introduction. Institutional arguments against judicial review are commonplace in constitutional discourse. The premise within the context of review of EU legislation 14 is principled analysis of the kind required by the principles in Article 5 TEU involving complex empirical and normative judgment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of different EU policies is beyond the capacities of the EU courts. This is because in such cases the Union
Courts are operating at the border of judicial legitimacy derived from their authority and competence. 15 A conventional understanding of democratic legitimacy thereto suggests that the primary responsibility for policy-making should reside with the EU political institutions which enjoy the legitimacy to perform this task. Only a political procedure can ensure that important decisions are taken after a transparent procedure in which all relevant stakeholders can participate and engage in a genuine political debate over the balance to be struck between conflicting interests. 16 The institutional problems of judicial review within the EU context are reinforced by the conceptual problems of the existing limits on EU competences. A lack of clarity as to the meaning of the principles in Article 5 TEU means that if the Court of Justice is to engage in proper substantive judicial review, it must become involved in assessing open-ended political, economic and social issues. 17 The Court is fundamentally ill-equipped for this task.
Furthermore, since several important legislative powers such as Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU are framed as purposive and functional powers defined by the goal to be achieved, 18 the Treaties have provided grounds for an expansive interpretation by the Union legislator of the scope of the Union's powers. 19 Appeals to objectives or policies cannot work as a limit to EU competences since they do not provide the Court with hard legal criteria to resolve disputes. 20 The teleological imperative of further integration enshrined in the design of the EU legal order has furthermore placed constraints on the Court to effectively enforce the vertical order of competences. If the Union is to achieve the objectives set out in the Treaties and resolve functional problems, the necessary powers must be placed at the service of the Union. 21 The Court has consistently with this imperative supported a broad interpretation of the scope of Union competences in order to enhance the effectiveness of Union law. 22 The
Court of Justice's position in the legal order of the Union furthermore counters against strict competence review. The Court is in fact an EU institution (and an agency of the Union) and may have institutional incentives to protect that interest. Certainly the behaviour of the Court in the past suggested that it viewed itself as a force for integration rather than as a guardian of Member State interests.
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The link between institutional, teleological and theoretical considerations in determining the intensity of judicial review is demonstrated by the Court of Justice's approach to scrutiny of legislation adopted under Article 114 TFEU. The wording of this provision-giving the EU legislator power to adopt the measures 'for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market'-suggests that the EU legislator has been conferred with a wide margin of discretion as to how it executes the internal market objectives. This discretion is well-recognised by the Court. For example, the Court has upheld the view, that the authors of the Treaty intended to confer a freedom of choice to the Union legislator under Article 114 TFEU depending on the general context and the specific circumstances of the matter to be harmonised, and with regards to the most appropriate mode and method for achieving the objectives of the internal market. 24 Ultimately, the Court's deferential approach has resulted in feeble enforcement of Article 114 TFEU.
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The reasons behind the Court's cautious stance to subsidiarity and proportionality can be traced to similar concerns. The subsidiarity principle forces the Court to engage in an assessment of the complex political-economic questions of reliance on Member State alternatives, and seek compromise using the values of efficiency and democracy in order to determine whether there is a need for EU action. These are matters of political judgment that the EU legislative institutions for reasons of legitimacy and competence are better equipped to evaluate. 26 The Court's own perception of its institutional capacity does in fact permeate its approach to subsidiarity review which is marked by an extremely deferential review of the principle. 27 When it comes to the Court's proportionality review of general EU policy schemes, it seems to be recognised that EU political institutions make policy assessments which involve complex factors to be balanced and weighed by the EU legislature. The EU courts are not well equipped to make these assessments and should therefore not overturn the EU legislator's political choices. 28 These general considerations have led the Court to review proportionality on the basis of a 'manifestly inappropriate' test which has resulted in poor enforcement of Article 5(4) TEU.
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Two points summarize the discussion so far. The first is the connection between the clarity of the Treaty limits in Article 5 TEU and institutional arguments for deferential judicial review.
Since the Court does not have any clear criteria against which it can assess conformity with the constitutional principles in Article 5 TEU, it must venture into the borders of its authority and analyse issues beyond the law to engage in the review required by this provision. The
Court is apparently not comfortable to take on this task. Secondly, there is force in the institutional arguments for lenient review of EU legislation. It appears axiomatic that the Court of Justice should, given its questionable expertise and legitimacy relative to the legislator, neither substitute the judgement of the appropriateness of EU measures or political choices where the EU legislature were required to balance divergent political interests against each other. This suggests that it may be difficult for the Court to engage in stronger substantive review as this would mean that the Court would have to go beyond its legitimacy and competence by reconsidering the EU legislator's political decisions. Notwithstanding these observations, there is still hope for more intense judicial scrutiny of the principles in Article 5 TEU. As contended in the remainder of this article, in order to respond to the arguments for deferential review advanced above, the Court is encouraged, to develop its current procedural form of review.
3.

The case for strict procedural review
Because of the numerous terms used in the literature, an account of a definition of procedural review 30 is necessary for the purposes of the present article. The article proceeds from a strict understanding of procedural review that compels the Court to consider whether the reasoning and evidence of the EU legislator is sufficient to justify the exercise of general legislative powers. 31 This suggests that the Court, as a minimum, should consider whether the EU legislator conformed to the procedural steps and structures mandated by the Treaties. 32 On the one hand, this definition is broader than that of 'pure' procedural review which entails that courts in its review focus exclusively on whether the legislature met certain statute-based procedural requirements in the legislative process. On the other hand, it is narrower than 'substantive review' that requires courts to determine the validity of legislation based strictly on an examination of the statute's content.
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What then are the pros and cons of procedural review? The key argument in support of this form of review is that it responds to the institutional objections against the Court of Justice's capacity to engage in competence review. 34 Whilst the EU legislator's choice of policy may go beyond the Court's authority to review, the question of whether EU legislative institutions has substantiated its legislative choices is an issue that the Court is well-equipped to examine. 35 Procedural requirements relating to the adequacy of the evidential basis for decision-making also helps remedy the problems of reviewing the constitutional principles in Article 5 TEU. 36 Since procedural review requires policy-makers to collect evidence, the Court will have at its disposal a useful mass of materials that will help it to determine the legality of a given act.
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The literature has, nevertheless, identified several problems with this type of review, namely that: i) intense procedural review regularly is transformed to substantive review, ii) procedural 30 EU institutions in Brussels. It is argued that more demanding procedural review imposed by the Court will be instrumental in addressing these concerns.
The premise for this argument is that such a form of review by courts supports a discourse of legitimacy by focusing on the legislator's justification, by fostering deliberation and by structuring the exercise of public power. Procedural review has its strongest underpinnings in procedural democratic theories that consider the process by which laws are generated as the main source of legitimacy. 59 Such theories contrast to substantive legitimacy theories which focus on the content of the law and its conformity with some normative moral standard. In the present context it is not necessary to determine whether it is most appropriate to endorse the procedural or substantive theories of democracy. There is particular legitimacy benefits connected to procedural justice and it is sustained that strict procedural review is apt to produce them. Several empirical studies (particularly of the US congress) indicate that a person's perception that the legislator employs fair decision-making procedures positively impacts on the social legitimacy of the legislative procedure. 60 The literature on procedural justice also suggests that a deliberative process that is perceived to be fair and inclusive to differing points of view receives higher legitimacy assessments and more positive assessments of the outcome produced than one that is perceived to be closed and partial.
On the basis of the literature reviewed in the previous paragraph, it is suggested that the model of procedural review advanced here will promote the values mentioned and thus be a legitimacy-reinforcing instrument within the EU. 61 The relationship between transparency and procedural review illustrates this point. In this respect, it appears that the Court of Justice's case law on the giving-reasoning requirement in Article 296 TFEU exhibits that transparency is one of the foundations for strong procedural review. requiring the EU institutions to substantiate their decision with reasoning and evidence, procedural review reinforce the importance of transparency in the legislative procedure. 62 It is thus contended that stringent procedural review may increase both the social and legal legitimacy 63 of the EU's decision-making procedures. By enforcing standards of rational decision-making and by requiring EU action to be more accountable the Court promotes the social legitimacy of the EU system of governance as a whole (and confidence among EU citizens to this system). 64 The procedural review model proposed here is also capable of advancing a broader culture of justification in policymaking by inducing the EU legislators to rely upon sufficient knowledge before they exercise their discretion. 65 This will in turn reinforce legal legitimacy as adherence to the court-imposed procedural requirements will serve as a check that the legislative outcome is in conformity with the Treaty mandate. The aspiration of procedural review is, thus, ultimately, to restore integrity in the making of EU legislation. 
Setting the framework for a general standard of review and test for legality of EU legislation
This section develops, on the basis of the procedural review framework suggested in section 3 a more concrete benchmark which the Court should use to review the legality of EU legislation.
A The Court of Justice's track record in procedural review
The following examines the Court's leading judgments on process-based review 67 , in particular with reference to the principles in Article 5 TEU.
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A review of the case law shows some common trends and development. information' pertaining to the situation and its failure to produce and present clearly the 'basic facts' which had to be taken into account as the basis of the contested regulation.
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Vodafone, concerned with a challenge to the EU roaming regulation, was the next important judgment on procedural review. In this case the Court clearly articulated a process-based approach to competence review by explicitly relying for the first time on the impact assessment and explanatory memorandum when examining the legality of an EU policy measure. 77 The Court did, however, not entertain intense process-based review according to 72 See also the fundamental rights case law mentioned in n 68. This turns us to the scope of procedural review. This section gave examples of procedural review in relation to all the constitutional principles in Article 5 TEU. It is argued that the Court should not, although most procedural review cases has been concerned with proportionality 86 , circumscribe procedural review to this plea but also use this form of review to also examine conferral and subsidiarity. 87 There is no a priori rationale for limiting review to proportionality as it appears that the concerns of vague conceptual scope and institutional considerations apply equally to subsidiarity and conferral. 88 As seen from the discussion here it is furthermore clear that the Court of Justice is willing to apply a form of procedural review also with regard to subsidiarity (Netherlands v Parliament and Council, Phillip Morris) and conferral (Vodafone, Phillip Morris), albeit not in the form advanced in this article.
Experience from the US shows further evidence for the contention that process-based review can be used generally to enforce the constitutional order of competences.
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B Spain v Council-providing the fruits for an appropriate standard for judicial review
This section develops, on the basis of the procedural review framework suggested in section 3, a more concrete benchmark which the Court should use to review the legality of EU legislation. Whilst the intense test in Spain v Council of 'relevant circumstances' has not, as 85 See below section 4 (E). 86 Case C-310/04 Spain v Council (n 31); Case C-58/08 Vodafone (n 9); Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical (n 82). 87 suggested above, been used consistently in relation to review of broad EU policy schemes 90 this section argues that this judgment should be used as a benchmark for judicial review.
As we know from above, in this case, Spain challenged a Council regulation on new support schemes for cotton on the basis that it infringed the proportionality principle by not taking into account relevant information when deciding on the specific amount of aid granted under this scheme. The Court underlined, as regards judicial review of the principle of proportionality, the wide discretion enjoyed by the Union legislature in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy and that a measure adopted in this field could only be affected if the measure was manifestly inappropriate in terms of the objective which the EU institution is seeking to pursue and if the institution has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion.
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Up to this point, the Court simply followed its standard case law on review of proportionality within the sphere of broad EU policies. However, the Court dramatically changed this course On the basis of these principles, the Court proceeded to annul the regulation. The Court noted that the Commission had failed to include certain labour costs in the study of the foreseeable profitability of cotton growing under the new scheme. The Court emphasised that labour costs was a relevant factor for the purposes of calculating the production costs of cotton and the foreseeable profitability of that crop. The Court also found that the potential effects of the reform on the economic situation of the ginning undertakings-whilst being a 'basic factor' to be taken into account-were not examined. The Court recognised that cotton production is not economically possible without the presence of such undertakings operating under sustainable conditions, since cotton has little commercial value before being processed and cannot be 90 See Case C-58/08 Vodafone (n 9); Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v Parliament and Council (n 11 The expression 'relevant information' used by the Court connotes implicitly a requirement in relation to the quality of the reasoning. The Court of Justice was not only critical of the fact that the Commission had failed to include labour costs and perform a socio-impact study. It also condemned the fact that the Commission had been unable to explain why an impact study was not necessary and why labour costs were not included in the assessment of profitability. 107 The Court's assessment of the profitability study is instructive. The Council, basing its argument on the reform's budgetary neutrality, contended that the profitability study should also take into account the income deriving from the single payment. Since the sum of the coupled and decoupled aid under the new scheme was equivalent to the total amount of the indirect aid granted under the previous scheme, the profitability of cotton growing could not be doubted. The single payment should not be taken into account according to the Court as it is granted independently of the crop chosen, even if the farmer decides not to produce anything. The budgetary neutrality of the reform was furthermore of no relevance for assessing whether in the future farmers will abandon cotton growing. and that the effect of the reform on the situation of the ginning undertakings was also 'relevant information' without which the Commission could not exercise its discretion.
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E A proposed standard for review and test for legality
The proposed benchmark suggests a two-step examination of legality of EU measures. The first part of the enquiry implies that the Court of Justice should look 'beyond the preamble of the measure' when examining the adequacy of the reasoning and consider whether the reasons stated by the EU legislator in the 'legislative background documents' 110 are pertinent for assessing compliance with the principles in Article 5 TEU. The test to assess whether the standard of 'adequate reasoning' has been conformed to is the following. The EU legislator must offer at least one justification, which is by itself sufficiently compelling to justify compliance with the relevant principle or rule whose observance the institutions must ensure. 111 The reference point for the adequacy of the reasoning is the substantive justifications for the exercise of EU competences, as this has been generally recognized by the EU law literature and/or the Court's case-law. One example is if the EU legislator employs an argument based on distortions of competition to justify the 'essentiality' of criminal sanctions under Article 83(2) TFEU. 112 Since the question of 'essentiality' of criminal laws under this provision is only concerned with a comparison of criminal laws with other sanctions, it seems incoherent to mingle internal market considerations into this assessment. 113 Such considerations are not 'relevant factors' 114 . 'Adequate' reasoning does not, however, require that the EU legislator offered the most appropriate reasoning for defending compliance with the precepts of the Treaties. 115 It is sufficient that the reasoning is 'adequate' to support adherence to the underlying Treaty condition or principle. 116 The second limb of the test considers whether the reasons are substantiated. In order to pass this part of the test, the EU legislator needs to show that the rationale given for the legislative act (which in itself justified the EU legislator's adherence to the relevant EU rule or principle)
is supported by sufficient and relevant evidence.
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This standard entails requirements both in relation to the quantity and quality of the evidence.
First, in order to prove a statement, it is necessary to refer to more than one source. If, for example, the evidence for a theoretically plausible claim consists of a reference to only one study or one scholarly article, this would be insufficient. 118 The Court ought furthermore to examine whether the evidence in the legislative background documents is 'adequate' for substantiating the exercise of the legislative competence. 119 Taking again the example of EU criminal law competence it is suggested that if the EU legislator uses evidence concerning 'distortions of competition' to justify the 'essentiality' of criminal sanctions it would also fail to conform to the standard of 'relevant evidence'. This is because the 'essentiality' of criminal sanctions can only be justified on the basis of evidence showing that criminal sanctions are a greater deterrent than other sanctions. 120 The evidence should finally be 'reliable'.
Insignificant evidence or evidence of low credibility (such as hearsay evidence) cannot be used to support a statement. This means that the evidence needs to be in the nature of statistical studies, policy studies or scientific articles which provide more serious support for an argument.
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F Rationale and issues with the test
The following considers the purpose of the test. The test is not a substantive one intended to limit EU action or finding out the proper level of action. 122 The test is functional to ensure that the political discretion granted to EU an institution is exercised in a rational manner and that the Court is empowered to review the exercise of EU competences. 123 Since the proposed test requires reasons and evidence to always be given for the exercise of competences, it is more likely that the Court will be able to fulfil its task of monitoring that the law of the Treaties is observed. 124 The pragmatic rationale for the test is that it is predictable by clearly articulating under which circumstances intervention is justified. 125 The reference point here is whether one of the reasons relied upon in a legislative act constitutes sufficient basis to support that act and is substantiated by relevant evidence.
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The main critique against this test of legality is probably that the proposed requirement on the EU legislator of offering 'one cogent reason supported with sufficient evidence' is borrowed from the Court of Justice's case law on fundamental rights and targeted sanctions 127 and its case law in the field of competition law/risk regulation 128 and that the concerns underlying this standard of review may not be applicable in the field of common policies. In the context of targeted sanctions, the strict interpretation of 'manifest error' has partly been driven by the limitations imposed on courts reviewing the Security Council resolutions that form the basis for EU regulations freezing assets of particular individuals and the fact those decisions have substantive negative effects for targeted individuals. 129 In relation to competition law, the strict review of 'manifest error' have been driven by the criticisms voiced about the role of the Commission as prosecutor, judge, and jury, and the fact that competition law enforcement is intrinsically concerned with potential infringements of the fundamental rights for the accused.
130
In this regard it is important to underline that Court of Justice's standard of review and intensity is not dependent upon whether review is undertaken in a specific area such as fundamental rights, internal market or competition law. The key rationale for stringent review in the discussed fundamental rights 131 and competition law and risk/regulation cases is related to the fact that these cases were concerned with 'individual decisions' or decisions of a similar nature. It is clear that the Union Courts in such cases are tasked with reviewing both the factual and legal assessment of the administrative agency or legislator, i.e. the Commission.
Although the freezing of assets cases were concerned with regulations those acts were in fact in the nature of individual decisions rather than general legislative acts. In Kadi II, Tetra
Laval and Pfizer, it is clear that there were targeted individuals and firms that were the subject of the decision/regulation. When the EU legislator rather acts as an executive than a general legislature less deference is justified because the effects of annulment are less draconic, because strict review of individual decisions does not encroach upon the EU legislator's political discretion and because individuals must be protected against discretionary interferences with their fundamental freedoms. 132 In relation to judicial review of the EU legislator's discretionary policy choices, other considerations are relevant. It might be argued that scrutiny in the context of broad EU common policies should be very deferential because the facts are complex, since the EU legislator undertakes discretionary policy choices and because the EU legislature has to reconcile divergent interests when making such policies. In these cases, the Court is also normally tasked with reviewing a broad piece of framework While this does not mean that a proper impact assessment is a requirement for legality, it implies, that the EU legislator must refer to empirical evidence, whether that be a scientific study, scholarly articles or statistics, to support the measure. 152 Admittedly, it appears that the test as applied to proportionality review rarely will result in annulment of EU legislation. The intensity of the test, however, entails that the EU courts would have to inquire more in greater depth into the claim that the decision was 'manifestly inappropriate' as compared to the classical approach. 153 Instead of simply clearing the Union legislator by noting that he has not crossed the barrier of 'manifestly inappropriate', the standard forces the Court to autonomously determine whether the EU legislator has supported his conclusions by relevant evidence. 154 The key distinction from the Court's current approach is thus that the proposal here asks the Court to be more intrusive when considering whether the necessary facts have been taken into account before exonerating the EU legislator.
Conclusions and reflections
The concluding part of this article contains a summary of the argument and reflections on the proposed model's consequences for the federal dimension of EU law.
The aim of this contribution was to examine the problems of judicial review within the context of enforcing the constitutional principles in Article 5 TEU. In particular, it queried how the Court of Justice, given the absence of appropriate legal criteria and institutional constraints, could develop a more intense form of judicial review in competence disputes. The main proposal for improving enforcement of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality was to use a procedural type of review, requiring the Court to examine the EU legislator's reasoning and evidence for a legislative measure. A move for the Court to stronger substantive review was rejected with reference to institutional constraints in terms of legitimacy and competence. 155 To some extent it appears that procedural review suffers from similar problems that are associated with substantive review. A procedural review is nevertheless less controversial in terms of institutional competence and democratic legitimacy than substantive review. Thereto, any disadvantages with a procedural form of review would be outweighed by the advantages of greater legitimacy in the EU decision-making procedure that such a review would entail. 156 The article subsequently developed on the basis of the Court's judgment in Spain v Council, a specific standard of review for all broad EU policy measures. This standard suggests that the EU legislator must offer 'adequate reasoning' and 'relevant evidence' for a proposed legislative measure in order for it to conform to the limits of the Treaties. 157 To control whether the proposed standard of 'adequate reasoning' and 'relevant evidence' has been met, the article proposed on the basis of the Court's ruling in Kadi II an intrusive test of legality.
The EU legislator must articulate at least one justification, which in theory -i.e. in light of the relevant literature and the Court's case law -is sufficient as a basis for exercising the competence and substantiate this rationale by 'sufficient' and 'relevant' evidence. Such a demanding test was justified on the basis that it would push the EU legislator to prepare more evidence-based justification and ultimately restore confidence in the EU political procedure.
What are then the implications of the argument advanced in this article? It appears that the proposed model is likely to have bearings for the federal dimension of EU law: the relationship between the EU and its Member States. The suggested process-based test is intended to be employed in highly contested challenges to EU legislation on the basis of proportionality, subsidiarity and lack of 'competence'/incorrect legal basis. The Court's approach these principles have serious constitutional implications for the Union legal order by shaping the distribution of competences and by defining the standards for examining the legality of a Union act.
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Critics of the test may argue that it will negatively affect the process of EU integration by imposing too cumbersome limits on the discretion of the EU legislator. Strict judicial review of the exercise of EU competences would compromise the Union's capacity to act efficiently in order to fulfil the tasks of the Treaties and would impose significant costs reflected in inflexibility. They may also argue that the test will stretch the Court of Justice's institutional capacities and force it to become involved in deeply political and constitutional choices on the future of EU integration and that the Courts lacks the democratic credentials to make those choices.
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There is force in this point as the proposed test may push the Court to the limits of its legitimacy and authority. However, counterintuitively, legitimacy may be the best argument for the Court to enforce the constitutional principles in Article 5 TEU more seriously after Lisbon. Infusing judicial review of EU legislation with greater force is, as argued above, not only a way of enhancing the accountability of the EU legislative procedure but also the legitimacy of the Court of Justice. 160 The Court of Justice was created with the aim of providing an unbiased arbitrator to mediate between the interests of the EU and the Member
States. The Court's approach to date is however inadequate as a safeguard of federalism. 161 The Court's weak stance in vertical competence litigation has not only failed to promote a culture of justification in the EU legislative process but also devalued Member State rights the observance of which the Court should ensure. If the Court continues on this path it will face legitimate criticism that it is failing in its task to ensure that the law of the Treaties are observed. 162 To address these concerns the Court must change its current deferential approach and review the exercise of EU powers with more vigour. The Treaty of Lisbon also suggests that the Court should submit the exercise of the EU competences to stricter control. By providing for a special review procedure for national parliaments of EU legislation, 163 by adopting a specific protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality, 164 announce that the issue of federalism is entirely subject to the whims of politics, the Union political branches would not take these values seriously in their own deliberations. 169 The
